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Structural Holes and Bad Ideas: Liverpool’s Atlantic Trade Networks in the 
Early-Eighteenth Century1 
 
Historians have been complicating their understandings of networks, and especially 
mercantile networks. Moving on from a rather positivistic approach based on family, 
religion and ethnicity, research has now started to stress the inherent problems 
inherent in networks.2 Furthermore, researchers have started to stress the problems in 
constructing and maintaining networks of whatever type.3 However, far less work has 
been conducted on the problems encountered in developing and under-developed 
networks, where key actors may be unduly influential because they have access to 
new and/or highly-prized information. Such key actors (often but not always, Mark 
Granovetter’s ‘weak ties’) can help to bridge what Ronald Burt has called structural 
holes in networks; that is, ‘the separation between non-redundant contacts’.4 Actors 
that stand near structural holes are ‘at a higher risk of having good ideas’ through the 
ability to better synthesise the various, different, and new information to which they 
have access.5 Moreover, that information is likely to be seen as high value and 
credited because that information is considered rare. Therefore, actors bridging 
structural holes are often perceived as positive players within a network.6 However, 
the very fact that these bridging actors have information arbitrage to their advantage 
means that they are also in a great position to act against the interests of the 
principal(s), especially where there is a lack of good governance.7 These opportunities 
could be seen as ‘bad ideas’, the opposite of Burt’s good ones. This situation could 
lead to bad decision making simply due to a lack of competency, through positive 
adverse selection, or even fraud.8  
 
Either of these behaviours could be seen as a type of network failure, which Andrew 
Schrank and Josh Whitford define as ‘the failure of a more or less idealized set of 
relational-network institutions to sustain ‘desirable’ activities or impede ‘undesirable 
activities’.9 They posit two types of network failure: absolute and relative – the latter 
of which is more relevant to the discussion here.10 They argue that relative failure 
occurs when networks fail due to a lack of competencies (involuted), or due to 
opportunism (contested). The first is due to ignorance and a failure to absorb enough 
information, and the latter occurs where there is sufficient competence, but safeguards 
against mistrust and opportunism are absent. The colloquial, if clear way they sum 
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this up, is the difference between a partner ‘screwing up’ and ‘screwing you’. 11 
However, this chapter will argue that both types of this relative network failure can 
occur within the same network, and at the same time. Furthermore, it will argue that 
this does not necessarily mean that the network has failed or is failing in a 
developmental or under –developed context. 
 
Bridging actors are clearly not going to have perfect information in a developmental 
context. Therefore, it is quite possible that adverse selection may occur, but without 
intentional moral hazard (involuted failure). It is equally true that fraud could occur 
on a large scale (contested behaviour). At the same time, such bridging actors, or 
middlemen, play a key part in market integration, despite the ‘significant difficulties’ 
they face in a context of new and developing markets, both in terms of geography and 
commodities, and indeed changing and/or new institutional contexts.12 However, 
without a developed network to oversee or correct these behaviours, they could go 
undetected for a long period of time. It is also quite possible that a network would 
continue and be (relatively) profitable, even if both of these behaviours were present. 
The other actors (especially the principals) might not realise that the adventure could 
be even more profitable because they do not realise that such behaviours are present. 
Actors might also trust strong ties, or those with rare or valuable information, because 
they want to believe it, or perceive that they have no other options.13 As long as the 
venture was successful to a certain extent, positive affect could cause relational 
cohesion and moral obligation, leading to a sense of group. This would become more 
reinforced over time with frequent exchange, because attachments can arise simply 
from the ‘idiosyncratic investment of learning to work together’ that produces 
pleasure over and above the economic profit.14 We know that economic actions are 
hardly ever taken by a mythical ‘rational economic man’, but occur within ‘ongoing 
systems of social relations’.15 Therefore, actors may not feel that the network is 
failing if they are making some profit and good feelings are being produced from the 
transaction(s). Moreover, in the long term, a developing network should improve the 
quality of information by diffusing competence, which infers that lacking in 
competence is simply part of the process.16 We might say therefore, from a broader 
perspective, that in a developing international trading environment a network with 
involuted and contested behaviours was performing as well as it could, or could be 
expected to do.In order to investigate the problems with developing networks these 
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ideas are applied to a case study of Liverpool’s developing Atlantic trade in the early-
eighteenth century. Whilst Europeans had been trading (and conquering) in the 
Atlantic world for over two centuries, Liverpool was still a minor, if developing port. 
It therefore provides an excellent prism for examining the problems with developing 
or under-developed networks. The next section outlines the context and the trading 
network. The following analyses the behaviour of two bridging actors; one of whose 
behaviour can cause the network to be characterised as involuted (relative failure due 
to lack of competency), and the other to cause it to be termed as contested (failure due 
to opportunism). The conclusion argues that despite the presence of lack of 
competencies and opportunism, this network was not failing, but was simply at one 
point in a process of development. Bad ideas were present, but did not represent 
failure. 
 
The Providence 
 
This case study derives from a voyage of the brigantine Providence 1711-13 which 
produced a case in the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer in 1714-16.17 
This side of the Exchequer was established in the sixteenth century and whilst not as 
important as Chancery, it assumed its doctrines, and the two developed side by side 
thereafter. Many cases also came to this court that would have been under the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty in the seventeenth century.18 People often used 
the equity side of the Exchequer when the payment of debts to the crown was 
involved, in this case, customs duties.19 The Providence was supposed to go from 
Liverpool, to Belfast, to New York, to one of the Leeward Islands (St Kitts, Antigua, 
Montserrat and Nevis), and then return to Liverpool. The voyage was therefore a 
sophisticated if peripatetic one, which seems to have been normal practice at this 
stage of the development of the Atlantic economy for the Dutch and the English.20 
Liverpool was then still a relatively small port of around 6,500 persons, but was 
building on its coastal and Mediterranean trade (with ports such as Livorno) by 
joining in the expanding Atlantic commerce.21 Indeed, at the very same time of the 
Providence’s voyage, Liverpool’s pro-active merchants were constructing the port’s, 
and indeed, the country’s, first wet dock, which was opened in 1715.22 This was built 
specifically to cope with Liverpool’s increasing trade with the continental colonies 
and the West Indies which had begun by 1665.23 Belfast was also an important port in 
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the Irish trade, a mainstay of the Liverpool trade at this time.24 New York, taken from 
the Dutch in 1664, was a major entrepôt port on the eastern Seaboard.25 The Leeward 
Islands, having become independent from Barbados in 1670 were starting to show 
their potential following years of laggard growth in the seventeenth century.26 This 
was also a period of war, with the War of Spanish Succession (1701-14) mainly in the 
European context, and Queen’ Anne’s War (1702-13) in the Americas. By 1711-12, 
the war was being fought mainly in Europe and was to some extent ‘on hold’ during 
the peace negotiations of those years, even if many of them were in secret.27 However, 
whilst the new Tory government in Britain was more concerned with reconstructing 
trade and the colonies, there were still plenty of privateers for the sailors to contend 
with.28 There were therefore a number of elements making the voyage of the 
Providence developmental as well as potentially dangerous. This was especially true 
in the commercial context of the Caribbean where no chartered or regulated 
companies had overall (supposed) control of the trade from England.29 
 
The sole owner of the Providence was John Cunningham, a non-conformist, which 
meant that he could not serve on the town council.30 However, this did not stop many 
elite Anglican merchants of the period adventuring goods on his vessels and under his 
management. These included Richard Gildart and William Clayton, both of whom 
served on the town council at various points, like many Anglican merchants, who 
dominated the Council.31 The Providence sailed from Liverpool laden with coal and 
salt in addition to a wide variety of textiles such as hats, linens, woollens, nails and 
iron for sale in New York and the Leeward Islands, with a stop in Belfast.32 The 
Providence returned from the West Indies with sugar and molasses.33 The crew also 
purchased provisions in Belfast and flour, pork, beer and other supplies in New York 
for sale in the West Indies, but the precise details are not recorded.34 However, the 
voyage did not go as planned, and the resultant case in the Court of Exchequer 
provides us with wonderful evidence of the problems of developing and 
underdeveloped networks during this formative period of Liverpool’s Atlantic trade. 
 
The Providence sailed from Liverpool on the 9th March 1711 and arrived in the 
Belfast Lough the next day. She was supposed to sail to New York on the 21st March, 
but did not leave for that port until the 28th March 1711. The Providence arrived in 
New York on the 16th May 1712 [the Julian calendar still being in operation], after a 
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journey of five weeks. She sailed from thence on the 4th August 1712 [forty-six days 
longer than planned].35 It was rumoured on board that she was bound for Antigua, 
which was sighted on the 31st August (as was Barbados), but instead they sailed to 
Nevis, where they arrived on the 1st September 1712. They eventually left the island 
on the 3rd July 1713 [250 days longer than planned], arriving in Liverpool on 6th 
August 1713.36 
 
Much of the evidence as part of the case in Exchequer relating to this long and 
extremely delayed voyage concerns the existence or otherwise of a charter party, and 
moreover, the dead freight and demurrage payments deriving from any such Charter 
Party if it existed.37 There is also a lot of evidence given about exactly what a charter 
party was and how they should be enacted. This is rather strange as charter parties had 
been in ‘common usage’ for centuries, and so it is likely that this evidence was given 
as part of an effort to try and find out whether a charter party did in fact exist for the 
Providence, and if so, who knew about it.38 Indeed, some leading merchants who 
were ‘very well skilled and experienced’ in such matters, were chosen to arbitrate the 
case.39 The arbitrators were John Earle, William Pemberton, Edward Tarleton, 
William Webster, Lewis Jenkyns, Jonathon Livesay and Thomas Seddon.40 Although 
the outcome of the case is unknown, they assessed that a further ninety six hogsheads 
of sugar and eighty bags of cotton wool, each bag containing two hundred weight, 
could have been freighted over and above what was imported (and for which 
freighters would have had to contribute if there had been a charter party). As the 
freight for sugar from Nevis to Liverpool was 3s 6d per hundred weight, this only 
amounted to £28,0,0. Furthermore, demurrage was estimated at £1590,0,0, and 
portage at £1575,0,0.41 The Liverpool arbiters decided that in satisfaction of all 
Cunningham’s demands as well as for freight of goods on board, as for dead freight 
and ‘all their Clayms’ they should receive twelve hundred and sixty pounds. 
Therefore a lot of money was at stake.42 It is not surprising then that the case 
documentation is filled with technicalities regarding charter parties, dead freight and 
demurrage. However, the evidence given by the litigants in their attempts to apportion 
blame for the delays encountered on the voyage (i.e. who caused the demurrage 
charges) tell us a lot about the behaviour of the ship’s captain Joseph Pearson, and the 
supercargo John Whiteside. Quite apart from the money at stake, the court case may 
have been a way of unearthing information about these two men, without accusing 
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them directly, which may have been difficult in a close-knit socially-embedded 
trading network such as in Liverpool. The merchants may have been concerned about 
the financial outcome of the case, but finding out whether these men could truly be 
trusted may have been equally important to them. 
 
Figure 1 outlines the network as constructed from the Exchequer records. The cluster 
on the top right is the dense network of Liverpool merchants exporting and importing 
on the Providence. The group on the bottom right are those giving evidence on the 
case, but not involved in the voyage. The network to the left of centre is the ship’s 
crew (or at least those that gave evidence). From the far left of Figure 1 it is clear that 
the records show very little evidence of networks in New York and the Caribbean. 
This could be due to the nature of the sources, but the evidence within them suggests 
that there were in fact few developed networks on the Western side of the Atlantic, 
despite the fact that some of the adventurers had traded to the West Indies before.43 
John Cunningham, the owner, is in the middle, but it is clear that Joseph Pearson the 
captain and John Whiteside the supercargo were extremely important bridging actors 
both geographically and within terms of the trading network in which there seems to 
have plenty of structural holes. They were therefore likely to be trusted and their 
information valued, but they also had opportunities for moral hazard and fraud. In 
fact, their respective behaviour could easily be characterised as lacking in competency 
(involuted) or fraudulent (contested) and therefore be termed as a case of relative 
failure within the network. As mentioned above, the embedded nature of the relations 
within this network may have made it impossible to accuse either of these men 
directly. This does not necessarily mean that the network failed however. By looking 
more closely at their reported actions and behaviour we can better analyse their role as 
bridging actors in this network. These records, whilst flawed and incomplete, tell us a 
lot about how and with what problems mercantile networks were developed in early-
modern Atlantic trade. 
 
Figure 1 
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Source: Interrogatories, 16 November 1714, E134/1Geo1/Mich 37; Interrogatories, 8 
April 1715, E134/1Geo1/East21; Decree, 1716. 
 
Joseph Pearson: Involuted Failure due to Incompetence? 
 
Joseph Pearson was the captain of the Providence. He was also 
a joint complainant with John Cunningham (the sole owner) in the original case in 
Exchequer, and therefore in opposition to the majority of the merchants involved in 
trading on the vessel (as shown in Figure 1 above). It would therefore appear that he 
was on the same side, or at least, continued to be trusted by Cunningham after the 
Providence’s voyage. However, there are several aspects of his behaviour that others 
in the network thought worth commenting upon in answer to the pre-set questions 
posed them.44 
 
The first was regarding the delayed sailing from Belfast Lough by a week. Henry 
Bibby, the foremastman (who gave evidence for the defendants in the original case), 
said that the originally planned sailing date of 21st of March had been good for sailing, 
that the ship had been ready, and therefore the delay was due to the ‘neglect and 
Omission’ of Pearson.45 Other ships had sailed at this time without a problem he 
added. Bibby further commented that Pearson had said that he was waiting for a 
signal or ensign – but that he [Bibby] did not know the real reason for the delay. John 
Marsden was a merchant in 1715 but was the captain of the Tabitha and Prescilla, 
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also in Belfast in March 1711. He confirmed that Pearson was due to sail from the 
Lough on the 21st March in the company of the Tabitha and Prescilla, the Elizabeth 
and Ann and the Three Sisters, the latter two of Liverpool, for ‘the greater safety’ of 
all ships, as the first had guns to combat privateers.46 Pearson stayed behind though he 
could have sailed, but Marsden did not know why he chose to either. Only one person, 
Henry Thompson, another foremastman, gave an explanation as to why Pearson did 
not sail with the other vessels. He reported that by the mistake of a pilot the 
Providence was hindered and retarded in her passage, and therefore lost the company 
of the other ships.47 This was not confirmed by any of the other deponents however.48 
It is difficult to say why Pearson delayed so long. It is unlikely that he was waiting for 
information from Liverpool – that was only a day’s sailing away, and we have no 
further clues as to the signal for which he was purportedly awaiting. 
 
Bibby, who appeared to have plenty to say about Pearson (perhaps because he had 
allegedly refused him permission to put some sugar on board at Nevis), thought that 
this late sailing had serious repercussions.49 When the Providence arrived in New 
York on the 16th May 1712 they found that a London ship had come in two weeks 
before and ‘lower’d the Markett’[sic].50 He believed that if the Providence had sailed 
for New York on the 21st March they would have come to a better and higher market, 
and that ‘the Adventurers or persons who were Concerned in freighting the Said Ship 
were considerable loosers[sic] by the Said Ship not Sailing from Belfast when ready 
as aforesaid’.51 Although trade was still rather peripatetic, a May arrival would have 
been late compared to other vessels arriving for the spring trade after the Hudson had 
melted. Therefore, it is worth noting that the vessel had left Liverpool quite late in the 
first place for a good spring arrival in New York. 
 
A second matter mentioned by several deponents was the seizure of the Providence in 
New York by Customs Officers. This was due to some coals being taken on board by 
Pearson without the proper certification. Bibby said that the vessel lay under 
condemnation for one month during which time the coals and other goods were sold 
by the Customs Officers. However, Henry Thompson argued that the officers only 
pretended ‘to have authority’, and that the coals were only seized for four or five 
days, after which time the vessel was entirely discharged of her cargo.52 It is not clear 
whether any correct documentation was eventually produced, whether this omission 
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was explained away, or whether there was an error on the part of the customs 
officials. Either way, it seems that Pearson’s error was due to lack of experience, 
rather than being fraudulent. 
 
The third matter of some confusion was the intended destination in the West Indies. 
Bibby, yet again ready to give evidence against Pearson, reported that the rumour was 
that the Providence was bound for Antigua, and that this was confirmed by the sailing 
course.53 Indeed, the vessel came in sight of St. John’s harbour on the 31st August 
1712, but according to Bibby, Pearson ordered the sailors to make for Nevis, which 
was indeed where they made land. Bibby thought this hazardous due to privateers 
being in the area. Indeed the Leeward Islands were all attacked by the French in 
periods of war, and St Kitts and Nevis particularly so.54 Andrew Singleton, another 
foremastman on the Providence, also reported that Whiteside had wanted to go to 
Antigua but that Pearson said that he could not justify this to the owner unless 
Whiteside could confirm the vessel would be fully loaded there, which the supercargo 
could not.55 This is strange as of the Liverpool adventurers that had traded to the West 
Indies during 1709-10, Antigua was the most popular island, and only William 
Clayton had exported to Nevis that year.56 According to Bibby, the decision to go to 
Nevis was a bad one as when then they arrived at the island on the 1st September 1712 
sugars were very scarce. This was not surprising since the harvest would have begun 
in January and continued until May.57 There were also several other ships there, 
including some from New York, which had no doubt pushed up the price of sugar and 
made sales of the Liverpool and New York exports more difficult. Bibby continued 
that the ship’s doctor, William Alcock, had been told that prices were better in 
Antigua, which he suggested confirmed the losses for the adventurers.58 This 
indecision over the destination in the Leeward Islands caused friction, but Pearson 
once again appears to have been acting in a trustworthy manner.59 
 
As we shall see below, Whiteside was accused of not getting freight as he should have 
done for the return voyage to Liverpool, but according to Bibby (yet again) Pearson 
also discouraged some factors from putting freight on board. Apparently Pearson 
(who clearly thought there was a charter party) told Archibald Hamilton and several 
others not to put goods on board because the charter party meant that their goods 
would be seized on arrival in Liverpool on account of ‘deadfreight and demurrage’ 
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[that is they would be seized until the extra costs were paid].60 This is indeed what 
happened, but this behaviour is strange. Perhaps Pearson was trying to create a good 
reputation for the Liverpool merchants he represented by being so honest. Certainly it 
hurt them financially in the short term. Alternatively Pearson may have been building 
up his own good reputation for when he might become a merchant in his own right in 
the future. 
 
A last aside that Bibby made against Pearson was to report that he went on the Jolly, 
man of war. His tone is accusatory, yet this was a time of war, and Pearson could 
simply have just been getting the latest information to protect the vessel and its 
crew.61 Given that the Leeward Islands lay near Martinique and Guadeloupe, the 
bases of French power in the eastern Caribbean, this was a very real danger at this 
time, Nevis having been attacked in 1706.62 
 
John Whiteside: Contested Failure due to Opportunism? 
 
In contrast to Joseph Pearson, the supercargo, John Whiteside, was one of the 
defendants in the original case. It would appear that he had had some falling out with 
John Cunningham the owner, but he was on the same ‘side’ of the case as the other 
merchants who were involved with the venture. However, his behaviour does seem far 
more suspect than that of Pearson. 
 
Whilst Pearson had held up the Providence for a week or so in Belfast, Whiteside was 
accused of holding up its progress from New York for three weeks, in fact in all they 
stayed forty-six days longer than specified in the [alleged] charter party. Henry 
Thompson, the foremastman, gave evidence that on arrival in New York in May, the 
crew was busy following Whiteside’s orders in delivering the cargo, including the 
coals that had been temporarily seized on arrival. Once the vessel was completely 
cleared, the crew then applied themselves to reloading the vessel according to 
Whiteside’s orders, apparently as per their instructions in the charter party.63 Once 
this was done the Providence sailed into the North river and had the ‘Jack and 
Antiant’[sic] flags flying as signals of readiness to sail from New York.64 However, 
Whiteside was not then on board, and it was only when he came on board three weeks 
later that the Providence and its crew finally set sail for the West Indies. Andrew 
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Singleton, another foremastman, confirmed this delay adding that the ‘ship continued 
waiting for the defendant [Whiteside] who as reported had not finished his business 
thereabout’, though there was no comment as to what this business might have been.65 
It seems strange that the vessel was made ready to sail and so was therefore 
presumably fully loaded (or as fully as possible) so long before the supercargo was 
ready; what was Whiteside doing in New York for so long? In holding up the vessel 
for such a long time for no apparent reason, Whiteside was surely negligent. As the 
vessel was in the river ready to sail he could not have been arranging more freight. It 
is possible that he could have been conducting legal business for Cunningham or one 
of the other venturers, but this long delay was clearly against the remit of any charter 
party. It was not good practise to hold up such heavily capitalised equipment as a 
sailing vessel. Whether he was working for the adventurers or on his own agenda 
during this time, this had serious repercussions on their [late] arrival in the West 
Indies, and far more so than Pearson’s delay in Belfast. 
 
It would seem that Whiteside was also to blame for the extraordinarily long stay in 
Nevis. Andrew Singleton reported that it was commonly known on board that 
Whiteside had an opportunity to sell all the cargo to one person residing on the 
island.66 John Dickenson, the ship’s carpenter confirmed this. The fact that Whiteside 
had lost an opportunity to dispose of the cargo he thought ‘delatory and negligent’ 
especially as he had refused a reasonable ‘markett[sic] Price for his Goods’.67 Henry 
Thompson, the other foremastman, concurred. He said that Whiteside could have 
disposed of the cargo within six weeks of their arrival at Nevis, and at a better price 
than he later received. No doubt any buyers on the island realised he was getting 
desperate to dispose of his goods.68 To further stress Whiteside’s culpability, 
Thompson added that he never knew of any fault in the master or the crew of the 
vessel, and that they had worked as fast as they could for the supercargo. John 
Dickenson agreed that Pearson and the crew were not at fault, and further noted that 
whilst the Providence was at Nevis [for over ten months] several other ships had been 
laden and sailed, including the Samuel, the Union from London and the Anvill from 
Bristol. Indeed, the latter had sailed from Nevis to Bristol and returned and re-laden 
all whilst the Providence was there.69 Even William Rollins, the one person who 
supported Whiteside on this issue by stating that Whiteside had been ‘very diligent 
and industrious in his efforts’, conceded that it would have been better for him to take 
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the opportunity of the early sale.70 It is possible that Whiteside was simply trying to 
get the best price for Cunningham and the other merchants. The selling of goods, and 
the purchase of sugar, so far ahead of the harvest was bound to be slow. Perhaps he 
had wanted to go to Antigua as some of the adventurers may have had better networks 
there, but as mentioned above, he did not feel able to ensure full sales even there to 
Pearson. However, the fact that so many deponents mentioned that he could have sold 
the goods earlier and for a better price, does appear to put the blame firmly on 
Whiteside. He seems to have been working on his own agenda. 
 
Whiteside, whether he was acting for the good of the ship, its crew and the 
adventurers or not, seems to have made some other poor decisions. During their stay 
at Nevis Whiteside ordered cable and a ‘considerable quantity of cordage’ to be 
brought on board by a sloop from St Thomas island, then belonging to the Dutch. 
Henry Thompson clearly thought these were stolen, or at the very least put on board 
illegally. He reported that when the ‘Queen’s officers were preparing to come on 
board’ to search the vessel, the cable and cordage were thrown overboard to prevent 
seizure of the vessel.71  Andrew Singleton also reported the same event.72 Even if the 
vessel was in desperate need for these items, stolen or not, and that Whiteside was 
acting for the best of the crew; it surely would have been better to purchase them 
legally at Nevis, or from another vessel. However, the Providence seems to have been 
sailed home successfully without these items, suggesting that in this Whiteside was 
working for his own advantage. 
 
A last possible hint at some fraud by Whiteside came from Henry Thompson. 
Thompson mentioned that he had seen Whiteside ordering or instructing Miles 
Rimmer the mate how to write the ‘markes’ of several hogsheads then on board.73 
Subsequently, Rimmer assisted Whiteside in changing the marks accordingly. 
Unfortunately the source does not tell us more about this incident and so we cannot 
know why this was done. 
 
Discussion 
 
Pearson’s failures, the delay of the Providence for a week in Belfast and the taking on 
of coals without certification, caused delays in the voyage which had financial 
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repercussions for the adventurers. However, his actions point to a lack of competence 
and knowledge rather than fraudulent activity. The decision to discourage people from 
freighting in the vessel from Nevis appears strange, but he does seem to have been 
acting honestly. His actions, no doubt part of socially-embedded behaviours, were 
possibly part of a long-term business strategy, even if it caused even higher dead 
freight charges for the Liverpool adventurers.74 They were certainly not the actions of 
a (short-term) rational economic man. It is also worth noting that much of the 
evidence against Pearson comes from Bibby, who seems to have held a grudge against 
him – although his accusations were corroborated by other deponents.75 The fact that 
Pearson was a plaintiff in the original case with Cunningham also suggests that their 
relationship had not broken down as a result of his actions. Pearson’s case therefore 
points to an involuted failure on part of the network, due to lack of knowledge and 
skills or competency. 
 
In contrast, in holding up the vessel for such a long time in New York and Nevis 
Whiteside was surely negligent, and possibly fraudulent. Both delays were clearly 
against the remit of any charter party (if it existed). In not accepting an early offer for 
his cargo in Nevis, Whiteside was perhaps waiting for a better price, which he may 
have got nearer the harvest period. However, the Providence did not leave Nevis until 
well after the next harvest had finished, which was inexcusable. Taking on board 
(apparently) illegal cable and cordage also seems to have cost money, which may 
have been his own money as part of a private venture. Certainly the Providence seems 
to have sailed back to Liverpool safely without these items. Whiteside definitely 
caused the most delays, and instigated the high demurrage charges that became due by 
the adventurers. The fact that Whiteside was a defendant in the case brought by 
Cunningham suggests that he was not acting on his behalf, or according to 
instructions. He was also co-defendant and co-plaintiff with the majority of the other 
merchants involved in the venture. However, he may have been acting along with 
them in arguing that there was no charter party in order to divert blame from himself 
because of the high costs involved in dead freight and demurrage if it were judged 
that there was a valid charter party. Whiteside’s behaviour does appear fraudulent or 
that he was at least acting on his own behalf, and therefore represents a contested part 
of the network. 
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The decision about which island to go to in the Leeward Islands, which was clearly a 
matter of dispute, was supposed to have been agreed to in New York by both Pearson 
and Whiteside.76 The orders to delay this decision until they (presumably) had better 
or later knowledge available in New York came from Cunningham. This delayed 
decision seems to have been normal in the peripatetic trade of this period; however, 
he should have given the decision to one or other of the men to avoid such arguments. 
Both Pearson and Whiteside contributed to the lengthy nature of the voyage. 
However, the voyage never left Liverpool at a good point in time for either a New 
York or a West India arrival. So we could place the blame on Cunningham as ship’s 
husband and owner, because the original planning was not good either. Therefore, it 
was not just Pearson and Whiteside who were to blame for the problems related with 
this adventure. 
 
It was not possible to establish whether Pearson or Whiteside worked with 
Cunningham or any of the other merchants before or after this case from the Port 
Books, because the captain is not always listed, and the supercargo not at all – unless 
importing on his own account. This means that without further evidence we cannot 
assess the long-term nature of Pearson and Whiteside’s relationship with the rest of 
the Liverpool network, although some of the merchants imported on the same vessels 
previous to this voyage. Neither is it possible to say to what extent Cunningham’s 
non-conformity and exclusion from the town council isolated him. He was certainly 
isolated in terms of the court case from the majority of the merchants, but whether this 
was religious politics or simply down to the others not wanting to pay dead freight 
and demurrage is unknowable from the available sources. At the same time, the 
arbiters, many of which were on the town council seemed to have found in his favour 
(perhaps because as merchants they would have liked a similar finding for 
themselves); but again, we cannot tell whether politics or economics was the driving 
force. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The case study of the Providence shows that relative failure of both types, involuted 
and contested, can be present in one network at the same time. The behaviour of 
Pearson and Whiteside had serious financial repercussions for the owner 
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Cunningham, as well as the other merchant adventurers. However, the voyage was not 
well planned or timed from the start, for which failure we need to look to 
Cunningham. Nor did Cunningham or Pearson apparently make the existence of any 
charter party sufficiently clear to the others freighting on the vessel from Liverpool. 
However, this venture occurred early in Liverpool’s Atlantic trade. Although some of 
the merchants had traded to the West Indies beforehand – and collectively Liverpool 
merchants had been trading to the West Indies since at least 1665, it appears that the 
networks on the Western side of the Atlantic were still developing and under-
developed. This meant that clearer or more precise instructions could not be given to 
the captain and supercargo, leaving the requirement for this journey to be rather 
peripatetic. Moreover, this lack of networks meant that there were no actors in place 
to advise, govern and/or report on the behaviour of Pearson and Whiteside in the 
Americas. Although the institution of the Exchequer was available to resolve this 
issue, transaction costs would have been much lower had good governance networks 
been in place.  
 
This does not necessarily mean that this network failed. This venture may have been 
only partly successful, but it did not deter Cunningham or the other merchants 
investing in similar voyages afterwards, so they must have considered it at least partly 
successful, if only in gaining new information and experience (developing 
competence) as part of a learning process. Furthermore, other merchants in the wider 
Liverpool trading community ventured into the West Indies in the decades that 
followed. Indeed, Liverpool became the leading Atlantic out port during the 1740s. 
Therefore, incompetency and fraud caused both Pearson and Whiteside to have ‘bad 
ideas’ within the structural hole(s) they were bridging, but this does not mean that the 
network failed; just that it was one which had both involuted and contested elements 
within it. The behaviour of Pearson and Whiteside should be seen as a ‘best case 
scenario’ within the context of a developing and as yet under-developed network. 
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